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Overview 
 
i The Systems Engineering Process 
i Risks Identified During SE&I RFP Development 
 A Couple of Relevant Historical Anecdotes 
i Selected SE&I Process Deficiencies & Their Consequences 
i Remarks 
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The NASA Systems Engineering Process
Design Processes applied to each product 
down and across product structure 
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The Pre-ESAS Exploration Architecture 
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PNST: Prometheus Nuclear Systems Technology 
HRST: Human System Research & Technology 
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Scope of SE&I RFP 
Under previous ESMD AA, it had been planned to contract the Constellation 
Systems Engineering & Integration.  This strategy has since been abandoned. 
Stakeholder 
Expectations Definition
Technical 
Requirements Definition
Technical 
Solution Definition
• Logical Decomposition
• Physical Solution
Planning
Assessment
Control
Decision
Analysis
Transition
Design Realization
Product Verification
Product Validation
Design Processes
Technical Management  Processes
Realization Processes
Design Output Realization Input
Design 
Input
Realization 
Output
Feedback
Iteration 
Loops
Feedback
Iteration 
Loops
ESMD  
Requirements 
Mission 
Configurations 
Constellation Element 
Requirements 
Constellation 
Elements 
The SE&I Task was (1) definition of the overall architecture & definition of the 
elements in concert with technology development & maturity, and (2) integration of 
the elements to form mission systems. 
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Elements of the Exploration Architecture  
(as defined by the ESAS) 
The SE&I Challenge – assure this set of elements 
successfully performs the Exploration Missions. 
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SE&I RFP Risks 
i Reviewed risks identified during SE&I RFP development 
i Of 14 major risks, 7 largely mitigated; the following, in my 
view, remain: 
 Human Rating Requirements 
 Technical Standards 
 Long Term Interoperability 
 Modeling & Simulation Standards 
 Integration Complexity 
 Requirements Changes beyond Phase A 
 Technology Maturity 
 
i All these risks will manifest themselves as changes to the 
technical baseline & associated contracts with associated 
cost & schedule impacts. 
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SE&I RFP Risks (con’t) 
i Human Rating Requirements 
 Was a source of considerable requirements uncertainty for the Space 
Launch Initiative and Orbital Space Plane Program, simply because 
NASA has never developed a Human-Rated space flight system 
under it’s guidance. 
 
i Technical Standards 
 Different Centers within NASA will levy different technical standards 
on different contracts for elements of the Exploration Architecture that 
must be integrated.  
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SE&I RFP Risks (con’t) 
i Long Term Interoperability 
 Selected inter-generational elements of the architecture must be 
interoperable.  For example, the Lunar Lander must be interoperable 
with the CEV, which will drive requirements in the block upgrade of 
the CEV, which will still be required to be interoperable with the Crew 
Launch Vehicle.   
 
i Modeling & Simulation Standards 
 Need Exploration-wide model verification, validation, & accreditation 
guidance such that models & simulations developed by different 
organizations can be integrated.  Need this soon so that it can be 
levied on contracts at their inception. 
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SE&I RFP Risks (con’t) 
i Integration Complexity 
 “Another important design rule, which we have not discussed as often as we should, 
reads: Minimize functional interfaces between complex pieces of hardware. In this way, 
two organizations can work on their own hardware relatively independently. Examples in 
Apollo include the interfaces between the spacecraft and launch vehicle and between 
the command module and the lunar module. Only some 100 wires link the Saturn 
launch vehicle and the Apollo spacecraft, and most of these have to do with the 
emergency detection system. The reason that this number could not be even smaller 
is twofold: Redundant circuits are employed, and the electrical power always comes 
from the module or stage where a function is to be performed. For example, the closing 
of relays in the launch vehicle could, in an automatic abort mode, fire the spacecraft 
escape motor. But the electrical power to do this, by design, originates in the spacecraft 
batteries. The main point is that a single man can fully understand this interface and can 
cope with all the effects of a change on either side of the interface. If there had been 10 
times as many wires, it probably would have taken a hundred (or a thousand?) times as 
many people to handle the interface.”  
 
• Low, George M., “What Made Apollo a Success?” Astronautics and Aeronautics 8 (3), March 
1970, pp. 36-45. 
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SE&I RFP Risks (con’t) 
i Requirements Changes beyond Phase A 
 During the NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory’s development of the 
Mariner 3 and 4  interplanetary spacecraft in the mid 1960’s, project 
managers kept statistics on design changes and observed “that the 
majority of the projects’ 1,174 design changes occurred at subsystem 
interfaces and in subsystems that contained state-of-the-art 
equipment.”  
• Ref:  Johnson, Stephen B.  The Secret of Apollo:  Systems Management 
in American and European Space Programs, The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, 2002, p. 107-108. 
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SE&I RFP Risks (con’t) 
 
i Technology Maturity 
 Technology maturity morphs to “use of heritage hardware”, which 
introduces it’s own risks (more to come on this one later). 
 
 
 
i Note:  New developments are risky, but so is the use of 
heritage systems.  In our business, there are no free lunches! 
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SE&I Risk Mitigation 
i Plan the Exploration SE&I task 
 Develop a comprehensive & coherent Systems Engineering Management Plan (SEMP) 
 Include sub-tier activities such as CEV and CLV, including Contractor efforts, within 
scope 
• Ensure adequate resources to perform SE&I 
 
i Execute the full systems engineering process 
 Ensure SE&I process during early program phases/prior to development contract award 
 Periodically monitor compliance to SEMP 
• Best practice from USN Fleet Ballistic Missile Program (ref. John Schafer, Chief 
Engineer) 
 
 
i But it’s not as easy as it looks. 
 Pressure to short-cut or even omit steps. 
 Especially when a Contractor proposes good rationale & expected efficiencies. 
 Especially when you’re using heritage hardware or software! 
 
 
i So what are the consequences of SE process shortcuts? 
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Selected Systems Engineering Process 
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Ariane 5 Flight 501 Failure 
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Ariane 5 Flight 501 Failure 
i Issue:  Reuse of the Inertial Reference System (SRI) from the Ariane 4. 
 Software functionality in general was maintained for commonality reasons, based on the 
view that it was not wise to make changes in software which worked well on Ariane 4. 
 A special feature of the SRI on previous versions of Ariane, but not needed on Ariane 5, 
was the primary cause of the error. 
 
i Impact:  Erroneous operation of the SRI and On-Board Computer led to flight 
failure at 40 seconds into the flight. 
 
i SE&I Deficiencies:  
 The SRI Systems Specification did not include operational restrictions for the chosen 
implementation.  Such a declaration, which should be mandatory for every mission-
critical device, would have served to identify any non-compliance with the trajectory of 
Ariane 5. 
 Closed-loop simulations conducted as a part of system functional testing did not include 
the SRIs. 
 
i Reference:  Flight 501 Failure Report by the Inquiry Board, Prof. J.L. Lions (chair). 
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ISS Propulsion Module 
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Incomplete Technical Requirements Definition 
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ISS Propulsion Module 
i Issue:  Reliance on heritage Space Shuttle propulsion system 
components with little/no initial oversight.  
 Since ISS Propulsion Module was to be an ISS element, ISS on-orbit 
hardware life requirements levied on the Propulsion Module systems. 
 Shuttle hardware did not meet ISS requirements (Certified for 30 days on 
orbit; requirement 12 years). 
 
i Impact:  Contributed to significant technical and programmatic baseline 
impacts, leading to cancellation of the Project.  
 
i SE&I Deficiency:  
 Contractor design team assumed that heritage Shuttle flight hardware met 
NASA requirements for ISS.   
 Government oversight identified the issue in the Systems Requirements 
Review. 
 
i Reference:  Steve Richards, Project Manager & Dr. Fred Bickley, ISS PM 
Chief Engineer 
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Incomplete Technical Requirements Definition 
and Technical Solution Definition 
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DART (Demonstration of Autonomous 
Rendezvous Technology) - launched 2005 
i Issue:  The DART program made extensive use of heritage and off-the-
shelf components.  Some avionics components had not been qualified for 
DART’s operating environment or were not space rated.  
 
i Impact:  Resulted in major disassembly of the spacecraft to test these 
components, which added 6 months of schedule slip and a significant 
cost.  
 
i SE&I Deficiency:  
 Early reliance on heritage hardware was not reviewed by engineering. 
 Therefore, proper time and funding was not allowed for re-qualification, 
verification, and validation of heritage hardware. 
 
i Reference:  Chris Calfee, Vehicle Systems Manager for DART 
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Wide-Field Infrared Explorer (WIRE) mission 
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Incomplete Technical Requirements Definition, Inadequate 
Assessment, and Insufficient Product Verification 
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Wide-Field Infrared Explorer (WIRE) mission 
i Issue:  Investigation board found two potential opportunities to catch a 
fatal design error in the pyro electronics:  Design review process and 
during test program. 
 
i Impact:  Loss of scientific mission (was recovered and was used for a 
number of asteroseismology investigations) 
 
i SE&I Deficiency:   
 Mission development requirements were delegated through three layers of 
organizations; lack of detailed design review of key components 
 Inability to perform end-to-end testing; poor fidelity of pyro test box 
 Anomaly during testing was not recognized as a potential design flaw 
 
i Reference:  WIRE Case Study by James S. Barrowman 
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Chandra X-ray Observatory GSE 
29 October 12, 2005 MSFC/Dale Thomas 
Incomplete Technical Solution Definition and 
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Chandra X-ray  Observatory 
i Issue: Early testing (9/97) revealed major underestimation of integration 
effort to support a August 1998 launch.  Use of prime’s existing GSE was 
the primary issue. 
 
i Impact:  Prime added FTE’s and MSFC provided FTE’s at prime’s 
location to support 24/7 integration schedule for the July 1999 launch 
date. 
 
i SE&I Deficiency 
 Inadequate Program requirements vs. GSE capabilities assessment 
• GSE had inadequate oversight/visibility early in program (existing GSE was part of 
an ongoing classified program) 
• GSE was provided by separate branch from program (Prime’s program lacked 
penetration) 
• Older GSE technology lacked automation capabilities and inadequate off-line 
equipment to support debugging activities. 
 
i Reference:  Fred Wojtalik, Program Manager 
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FASTRAC Engine Seal Failure 
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Incomplete Technical Solution Definition
Stakeholder 
Expectations Definition
Technical 
Requirements Definition
Technical 
Solution Definition
• Logical Decomposition
• Physical Solution
Planning
Assessment
Control
Decision
Analysis
Transition
Design Realization
Product Verification
Product Validation
Design Processes
Technical Management  Processes
Realization Processes
Design Output Realization Input
Design 
Input
Realization 
Output
Feedback
Iteration 
Loops
Feedback
Iteration 
Loops
33 October 12, 2005 MSFC/Dale Thomas 
FASTRAC Engine Project 
i Issue:  Selection of Operational Cryogenic LOX Valve for use with RP-1 
Fuel. 
 Cursory assessment erroneously deemed RP-1 environment less severe than 
LOX. 
 
i Impact:  Resulted in minor test stand fire, loss of approximately one 
month hot fire schedule, emergency, real time valve test, evaluation and 
redesign; co-location of government “tiger team” personnel onsite at 
contractor facility with 7 day/week, extended shift operation team during 
test and evaluation, valve redesign cost.  
 
i SE&I Deficiency:  
 No Detailed analysis of valve design in new application 
 Valve operation in new environment was not thoroughly investigated;   
Material property (i.e. modulus of elasticity) change with temperature was 
overlooked, resulting in excess deflections during valve transient operation 
and failure of valve to close properly on command.  
 
i Reference:  George Young - Chief Engineer; Tim Ezell – Tiger Team 
Member 
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Hubble Space Telescope Spherical Aberration 
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Flawed Design Realization, Incomplete Product 
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Hubble Space Telescope Spherical Aberration 
i Issue:  Primary mirror improperly ground, resulting in a spherical aberration that 
rendered the wide field camera useless.   
 
i Impact:  COSTAR (the Corrective Optics Space Telescope Axial Replacement) 
was developed to counter the effects of the flawed shape of the mirror.  
 COSTAR was a telephone booth-sized instrument which placed 5 pairs of corrective 
mirrors, some as small as a nickel coin, in front of the Faint Object Camera, the Faint 
Object Spectrograph and the Goddard High Resolution Spectrograph.  
 Installed on the first HST Servicing Mission 
 
i SE&I Deficiency: 
 The reflective null corrector (RNC) used as an optical template to shape the mirror was 
flawed, resulting in an improperly shaped primary mirror. 
 Data from other devices used in mirror alignment & calibration indicated problems with 
the RNC, but these results were discounted as being flawed themselves. 
 End-to-end test of the Optical Telescope Assembly was not performed due to expense. 
 
i Reference:  HST Optical Systems Failure Report 
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Mars Observer 
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Inadequate Planning & Control, Flawed Technical Solution 
Definition & Design Realization and Incomplete Product 
Verification 
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Mars Observer 
i Issue:  Design and component heritage qualification that was 
inappropriate for the mission.  
 
i Impact:  Contact with Mars Observer was lost three days before 
scheduled orbit insertion, for unknown reasons.  
 
i SE&I Deficiency: 
 failure to qualify the traveling wave tube amplifiers for pyro firing shock;  
 design of the propulsion system;  
 use of a fault-management software package that was not fully understood,  
 The Board also noted that “the discipline and documentation culture 
associated with, and appropriate for, commercial production-line spacecraft is 
basically incompatible with the discipline and documentation required for a 
one-of-a-kind spacecraft designed for a complex mission. Mars Observer was 
not a production-line spacecraft.” 
 
i Reference:  Mars Observer Mission Failure Investigation Board Report 
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Remarks 
i There are very real consequences for short-cutting the Systems 
Engineering process. 
 
i Prime contracts are often negotiated on the basis of assumptions that 
pre-suppose the outcome or even omit selected steps of the systems 
engineering process. 
 
i Reuse of exiting technology or heritage hardware/software can tempt one 
to omit steps in the front end of the systems engineering process. 
 
i When system testing is scaled back, technical assessment must be 
scaled up proportionately. 
 
